January
27, 2003
Contact: Stephen M. Apatow
Director of Research
& Development
Humanitarian Resource
Institute Legal Resource Center/International Peace Center
Eastern USA: (203) 668-0282
Western USA: (775) 884-4680
Legal Resource Center:
http://www.humanitarian.net/law
International Peace Center:
http://www.humanitarian.net/peace
Email: s.m.apatow@humanitarian.net
COLLABORATION ELUSIVE
AS WMD THREAT ESCALATES, LEAVING MILITARY INTERVENTION A TRAGIC ALTERNATIVE
During the last year, efforts
to establish unity among leaders of peace organizations and the interfaith
community have failed to yield the substantive action necessary to address
the cycle of violence currently spiraling to new levels. This challenge
has directly contributed to the potential need for military intervention
as a response to the threat against the United States and international
community.
As outlined in the brief,
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation and International Security
(http://www.humanitarian.net/law/nonproliferation1082002.html):
In a direct breech of the
NPT, both Pakistan and India conducted nuclear tests (1998) and now possess
nuclear weapons that have required direct attention regarding their safety
and security in terms of unauthorized or accidental use or accessibility
to theft or seizure by terrorist groups. The complexity of containment
of nuclear weapons, materials and expertise sought by proliferators requires
direct action of the international community to prevent terrorist factions
or unstable states from possessing nuclear weapons. The window of
vulnerability for large quantities of fissile materials (Russia's inventory
through 2007) encompasses the need for counter terrorism efforts to block
the formation and activities of large scale international terrorist organizations.
Current U.S. Nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union [1] include:
· Material Protection,
Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program (DOE): Improving Security of
603 tons of nuclear weapons material at 53 sites and for 1000's of navel
n-weapons.
· Mayak Fissile
Material Storage facility (DOD): The construction of a secure facility
for 50 tons of weapons plutonium.
Aktau-BN-350 Breeder Reactor
Project: The security of 3 tons of high quality Pu in spent fuel.
· HEU Purchase
Agreement - "Megatons to Megawatts" program (U.S. Enrichment Corporation
- USEC): Purchase of 500 tons of weapons grade uranium over 20 years, blended
down to non-weapons usable nuclear power plant fuel.
· Plutonium
(Pu) Disposition (DOE): The elimination of 34 tons of Russian Weapons Pu
by irradiating materials as mixed oxide fuel in Russian nuclear power plants.
· Pu Production
Reactor Shut Down Agreement (DOE): End annual production of 1.8 tons (total)
or weapons plutonium at three remaining Russian production reactors, while
providing alternatives.
Today, the Biological weapons
threat demands the development of a robust national and international infrastructure.
The creation of an advanced pathogen, either accidentally or deliberately,
could pose a major threat to the well being and even the survival of the
human species. [2]
In January, 2001, Australian
scientists developing a contraceptive vaccine for controlling field mice
populations sought to enhance the vaccines effectiveness by inserting the
gene for the immune regulatory protein interleukin-4 (IL-4) into mousepox,
which was being used as a carrier virus. IL-4 is a substance that
is normally produced in mice, but insertion of the IL-4 gene into the mousepox
genome unexpectedly transformed the normally benign virus into a virulent
strain that shut down the immune system and killed all the animals in the
experiment. In addition to rendering mousepox lethal in mice genetically
resistant to the virus, the inserted gene made the mousepox vaccine ineffective
- the recombinant virus killed even those mice that had previously been
vaccinated. [3] Since human beings possess the interleukin-4 gene,
it is possible that inserting this gene into a poxvirus that infects humans,
such as smallpox or monkeypox, could create a lethal strain that would
be resistant to the existing smallpox vaccine. [4]
Current threats involving
the deliberate reintroduction of smallpox as an epidemic disease would
be an international crime of unprecedented proportions, but it is now regarded
as a possibility. [5] Without intervention, each person infected
with smallpox could infect between 10 and 20 others in a society that had
not been immunized. Epidemiologists refer to this number as the "transmission
rate" of an epidemic.
A transmission rate of 20
means the first 50 victims could infect 1,000 others, and these "second
generation" cases could infect 20,000 more, who would infect 400,000, and
so on. The sixth generation of such a mathematical progression would be
160 million and if such a hypothetical epidemic were to occur with smallpox,
that number of cases would be reached in approximately 10 weeks after the
first case appeared.
The impact of a bioterrorist
incident presents the challenge of mass casualties, the closure of roads,
airports and waterways causing interstate and international commerce to
potentially grind to a halt as containment and control becomes the priority.
As economic scenarios in the global war against terrorism are assessed,
the significance of a bioterrorist incident with an agent such as smallpox
would present a catastrophic geopolitical challenge.
TIME TO EMBRACE RESPONSIBILITY
The International Interfaith
Peace Declaration (http://www.humanitarian.net/peace/declaration.html),
presented to leaders from the interfaith community, intergovernmental/non-governmental
organizations, United Nations programs and members of the international
community presented the following objective:
"Whereas it is essential
that peace efforts move beyond military interventions and diplomatic relations
to a new level of intercultural-interfaith dialogue and cooperation to
achieve a consensus for peace on the grass roots level within the borders
of every nation,"
To achieve:
"The objective of conflict
resolution, healing and reconciliation is pursued as a vehicle for revitalization
of the economic, environmental, political, social and moral challenges
facing our Earth community."
The seriousness of the challenges
facing the international community are daunting, but at the present time,
a window of opportunity exists for the "peoples of the United Nations"
as the ultimate units of international society to focus on the potential
of the "Butterfly Effect." Secretary General Kofi Annan [6] commented
on the phenomenon during his acceptance of his Nobel Peace Prize, on 10
December, last year:
"According to scientists,
the world of nature is so small and independent that a butterfly flapping
its wings in the Amazon rainforest can generate a violent storm on the
other side of the earth. He noted that, for better or worse, the
world of human activity also has its own "Butterfly Effect" - human actions
can either save the world or destroy it."
.References:
[1] Spector, The New landscape
of Nuclear Terrorism, Monterey Institute of International Studies - After
9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No.8, May 2002, p.
11-12.
[2] Andrew Pollack, "Wiuth
Biotechnology, a Potential to Harm," New York Times, November 27, 2001;
Claire M. Fraser and Malcolm R. Dando, "Genomics and Future Biological
Weapons: The Need for Preventative Action by the Biomedical Community,"
Nature Genetics 29 (2001), pp. 253-65.
[3] R.J.Jackson et al. (2001),
"Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Supresses
Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox,"
Journal of Virology, 75 (2001), pp. 1025-10.
[4] Tucker, Regulating Scientific
Research of Potential Relevance to Biological Warfare, Monterey Institute
of International Studies - After
9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No.8, May 2002, p.
24.
[5] Centers for Disease
Control, Smallpox
Reference Materials. JAMA, Smallpox
as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management, Vol.
281 No. 22, June 9, 1999.
[6] Annan, We
Can Love What We Are, Without Hating What - And Who - We Are Not, UN
Press Release SG/SM/8071, October 2001.
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