July
2, 2002
Contact: Stephen M. Apatow
Director of Research
& Development
Humanitarian Resource
Institute Biodefense Reference Library/Legal Resource Center
Eastern USA: (203) 668-0282
Western USA: (775) 884-4680
Biodefense Reference
Library: http://www.humanitarian.net/biodefense
Legal Resource Center:
http://www.humanitarian.net/law
Email: s.m.apatow@humanitarian.net
BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIC WEAPONS
CONVENTION: A CRUCIAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
According to the World Health
Organization, immunization with the smallpox vaccine -- made from a live
weakened virus -- would now be fatal for many people whose immune system
is impaired by HIV [1]. Therefore, vaccination would be contraindicated
for certain groups that include persons with immune disorders or
those experiencing therapeutically-induced immunosuppression, persons with
HIV infection, and persons with a history of eczema [2].
According to Anthony S. Fauci,
M.D, as the AIDS epidemic enters its third decade, more than 900
000 individuals are living with HIV infection in the United States
and another 460 000 HIV-infected people in this country have died.
An additional 40 000 Americans will become newly infected with HIV
this year. More than half of these infections will occur in young people
under age 25. Around the world the situation is much worse: 40 million
people are living with HIV/AIDS, and 22 million HIV-infected individuals
have already died [3].
HIV and smallpox vaccination
present a significant challenge to the statistical equation. Unlike other
emerging infectious diseases, there is not a public health mandate for
HIV testing combined with contact tracing for known at-risk contacts.
Therefore, the presence of hidden HIV infection in a population base presents
a new dimension of issues that would arise from this variable combined
with associated contraindications for vaccination in a bioterrorist incident.
1. WHO Infectious Diseases
Report, Chapter 7 text. <http://www.who.int/infectious-disease-report/pages/ch7text.html>
2. WHO Fact Sheet on Smallpox,
Contraindications, October 2001. <http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/smallpox/factsheet.html>
3. Fauci, Director, National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes
of Health, HIV Vaccine Awareness Day, May 18, 2002. <http://www.niaid.nih.gov/newsroom/mayday/faucimessage.htm>
BACK OF THE ENVELOPE
Kemper et al. did a "Back
of the Envelope" presentation of possible risks associated with smallpox
vaccination for the Effective Clinical Practice, March/April 2002
issue for the American College of Physicians (ACP) journal. They concluded:
"After excluding high-risk individuals and their contacts, we estimate
that a vaccination strategy directed at people aged 1 to 29 years would
result in approximately 1600 serious adverse events and 190 deaths. Vaccinating
people aged 1 to 65 years would result in approximately 4600 serious adverse
events and 285 deaths. Limitations: While advances in health
care over the past 3 decades could mitigate vaccine complications, the
increased number of unimmunized high-risk individuals (e.g., those with
eczema or immune suppression) could increase complication rates."
They then went on to discuss
the limitations and additional dangers to "high-risk" individuals of a
mass immunization campaign. "We assumed that individuals would be
screened before vaccination for risk factors, such as eczema, immunodeficiency,
or pregnancy, in themselves or in their close contacts. The prevalence
of eczema and the number of immunocompromised individuals have increased
over the past 3 decades. High-risk populations would be excluded from vaccination,
as would their potential contacts, since recent vaccine recipients
are "infectious" and can transmit the virus (vaccinia).
Individuals with eczema are
at high risk for developing eczema vaccinatum. The prevalence of eczema
is at least 10 percent, or more than 28 million people in the United States.
Immunocompromised persons are at high risk for progressive vaccinia. We
know of no overall estimate for the number of immunocompromised individuals
in the United States. This number would include recipients of organ transplants
(184 000 solid-organ transplants in the 1990s), individuals with diagnosed
and undiagnosed HIV infection or AIDS (850 000), and patients with cancer
(approximately 8.5 million). We estimate, therefore, that in the
entire U.S. population as many as 10 million individuals (3.6 percent)
may be at increased risk for developing progressive vaccinia.
Therefore, approximately
15 percent of the population may have increased risk for a direct adverse
event after smallpox vaccination. In addition to exclusion of these individuals
from vaccination, persons in close contact with them should not be vaccinated
to avoid inadvertent transmission and subsequent indirect adverse events.
Close contacts would include, at minimum, household members. Insufficient
data are available to estimate precisely the number of close contacts who
would be excluded from a vaccination campaign. We estimate that another
10 percent of the population would be excluded. On the basis of the foregoing,
we further estimate that 25 percent of the population would be excluded
from vaccination because of high risk or the possibility of coming in contact
with a high-risk individual." (<http://www.acponline.org/journals/ecp/marapr02/kemper.htm>)
Reference: ProMED:
Smallpox Vaccine ACIP Recommendations - USA (02)
BIOLOGICAL
AND TOXIC WEAPONS CONVENTION CONSIDERED CRUCIAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT IN THE
GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
Recent
discussion regarding complications associated with smallpox vaccination
and HIV infection has once again drawn international attention to the importance
of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention as a crucial legal instrument
in the global war against terrorism.
Highlights
of Issues Discussed during the The Eight Meeting of the ASEAN Regional
Forum, Ha Noi, 25, July 2001(US
State Department: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Washington, DC)
included:
24.
The Ministers discussed issues relating to proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery as well the implications of
missile defence systems. They noted expressions of support for the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation
regime. The Ministers also took note the call for all states to sign and
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to accede to the NPT.
The Ministers urged all states to maintain existing moratoria on nuclear
testing. They also took note of the call made in the NPT Review Conference
Final Document on the Conference in Disarmament to agree on a programme
of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on the
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. The Ministers further emphasised the importance
of systematic and progressive efforts by Nuclear Weapon States on nuclear
disarmament and called on all states to work towards the objective of total
elimination of nuclear weapon.
25.
The Ministers expressed their hope that the Protocol strengthening the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) would be finalised before
the 5th BTWC Review Conference and urged all countries to speedily conclude
their negotiations on the said Protocol.
TEXT OF THE BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION
Source:
UN Department for Disarmament Affairs
Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
Opened for signature at London
(L), Moscow (M) and Washington (W): 10 April 1972
Entered into force: 26 March
1975
Depositary Governments:
Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and United States
of America
The States Parties to this
Convention,
Determine to act with a view
to achieving effective progress toward general and complete disarmament,
including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass
destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production
and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and
their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement
of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control,
Recognizing the important
significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed
at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which
the said Protocol has already made and continues to make, to mitigating
the horrors of war,
Reaffirming their adherence
to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all
States to comply strictly with them,
Recalling that the General
Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary
to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,
Desiring to contribute to
the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement
of the international atmosphere,
Desiring also to contribute
to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations,
Convinced of the importance
and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective
measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical
or bacteriological (biological) agents,
Recognizing that an agreement
on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents
a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective
measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling
of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,
Determined, for the sake
of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,
Convinced that such use would
be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be
spared to minimize this risk,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
Each State Party to this
Convention undertakes never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile
or otherwise acquire or retain:
Microbial or other biological
agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types
and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective
or other peaceful purposes;
Weapons, equipment or means
of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes
or in armed conflict.
ARTICLE II
Each State Party to this
Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as
soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force
of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of
delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession
or under its jurisdiction or control. In
implementing the provisions
of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect
populations and the environment.
ARTICLE III
Each State Party to this
Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly
or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State,
group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise
acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery
specified in article I of the Convention.
ARTICLE IV
Each State Party to this
Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, takes
any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production,
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment
and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within
the territory of such State, under its
jurisdiction or under its
control anywhere.
ARTICLE V
The States Parties to this
Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving
any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the
application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation
pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international
procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance
with its Charter.
ARTICLE VI
(1) Any State Party to this
Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of
obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint
should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as
a request for its consideration by the Security Council.
(2) Each State Party to this
Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which
the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received
by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to
the Convention of the results of the investigation.
ARTICLE VII
Each State Party to this
Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with
the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests,
if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger
as a result of violation of the Convention.
ARTICLE VIII
Nothing in this Convention
shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations
assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.
ARTICLE IX
Each State Party to this
Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of
chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations
in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures
for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and
for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment
and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of
chemical agents for weapons purposes.
ARTICLE X
(1) The States Parties to
this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate
in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a
position to do so shall also cooperate in
contributing individually
or together with other States or international organizations to the further
development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology
(biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.
(2) This Convention shall
be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or
technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international
cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities,
including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents
and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with
the provisions of the Convention.
ARTICLE XI
Any State Party may propose
amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each
State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority
of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining
State Party on the date of acceptance by it.
ARTICLE XII
Five years after the entry
into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority
of the Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect
to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention
shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention,
with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions
of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on
chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account
any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.
ARTICLE XIII
(1) This Convention shall
be of unlimited duration.
(2) Each State Party to this
Convention shall in exercising its natural sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests
of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States
Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three
months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
ARTICLE XIV
(1) This Convention shall
be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the
Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3)
of this Article may accede to it at any time.
(2) This Convention shall
be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification
and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of
the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated
the Depositary Governments.
(3) This Convention shall
enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two
Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the
Convention.
(4) For States whose instruments
of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into
force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the
deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.
(5) The Depositary Governments
shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of
each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification
or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention,
and of the receipt of other notices.
(6) This Convention shall
be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE XV
This Convention, the English,
Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic,
shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly
certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary
Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
Related Information
