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Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Biodefense and Epidemiological
Tracking
In contrast to the spread of West Nile Virus (West Nile
Virus - Biodefense
and Epidemiological Tracking: from the initial index case in New
York City throughout the North American Continent during the period
from 1999-2003, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) has crossed
international boundries within a matter of weeks.
.
In SARS
patients, neutralizing antibodies are detected 2-3 weeks after the
onset of disease, and 90% of
patients recover without hospitalization. In
animals,
reinfection with coronaviruses is common, with or without
disease symptoms. The duration of shedding of SARS-CoV from respiratory
secretions
of SARS patients appears to be quite variable. Some animals can shed
infectious
coronavirus persistently from the enteric tract for weeks or months
without
signs of disease, transmitting infec-tious virus to neonates and other
susceptible animals. (J.
Clin. Invest. 111:1605–1609, 2003)
This variable could be considered significant in the
context of populations (individuals) that have developed
sufficient immunity following widespread exposure
to SARS-CoV, the potential for reoccurrence of clinical infection and international spread of
the contagion. (SARS
transmission in aircraft, N Engl J Med 2003; 349: 2416-22. 18 Dec 2003).
The scope of these risks warrant special
considerations for suspect cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS), as outlined in the new guidelines released by the
International Disease
Society of America.
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In The Spotlight
- SARS:
A double epidemic model for the SARS propagation: BMC Infectious
Diseases 2003,3 :19.
- Bird
Flu a Disaster for Poultry Production, Threatens Global Food Security:
Avian influenza has caused great damage to livestock production and
threatened global food security, statistics released by FAO earlier
February showed
that more than 450 million birds had been culled in Asia excluding
China,
about some 0.7 percent of the region's total inventory. Stephen
M.
Apatow, Humanitarian Resource Institute, 23 February 2004.
- SARS,
flu tough to tell apart: It's mid-January and you've got a fever, a
cough and an all-over achiness. Must be the flu, right? Then
again, could it be SARS? How are you -- or your doctor -- supposed to
know? ``That's a very good question and one we have no answer for right
now,'' said Dr. Marguerite Erme, the Akron Health Department's
disease-control medical officer. National Flu Surveillance Network.
- Update of practice guidelines for the management of
community-acquired pneumonia in immunocompetent adults: Infectious
Diseases Society of America, Clinical Infectious Diseases,
2003;37:1405-1433. See also: New
guidelines give specifics for pneumonia care, American Medical
Association News, Dec. 22/29, 2003.
- SARS
coronavirus: a new challenge for prevention and therapy: The genes
of SARS-CoV were compared with the corresponding genes of known
coronaviruses of humans, pigs, cattle, dogs, cats, mice, rats,
chickens, and turkeys.
Each gene of SARS-CoV has only 70% or less identity with the
corresponding
gene of the known coronaviruses. Thus, SARS-CoV is only dis-tantly
related
to the known coronaviruses of humans and animals. Phylogenetic analysis
suggests that SARS-CoV does not fit within any of the three groups that
contain all other known coronaviruses. Holmes, J. Clin. Invest.
111:1605–1609 (2003). doi:10.1172/JCI200318819. For additional
information, visit the: HRI
Bioinformatics: Pathobiological Diagnostics Site.
- SARS Down
But Still
a Threat: National Intelligence Council, Intelligence Community
Assessment,
August 2003.
- International
Law, Communicable Diseases and the Geopolitical Objective of Minimal
Interference with World Trade and Travel: Stephen M. Apatow,
Humanitarian Resource Institute Legal Resource Center, 5 May 2003. This
articles focuses on the importance of current U.S. State Department
Warnings. For additional information, visit the: HRI:
SARS Legal Resource and Information Center.
- SARS scare reminiscent of 1918 crisis Death rate
appears to
eclipse that of Spanish flu Donald Henderson knows
history, and he is worried. The doctor who led the
international effort to eradicate
smallpox said he’s worried about history repeating itself, only on a
much
deadlier scale this time around. -- 19 May 2003, Toledo Blade
Related News & Information
Educational Materials
- Coronavirus - Medline: Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome, The National Library of Medicine and National
Institutes of Health.
- Influenza - Medline: The National Library
of Medicine and National Institutes of Health
Communicable Disease Surveillance & Response (CSR)
Politics influences outbreak investigation. It is not
unusual for health authorities in affected countries to refuse to
cooperate with international
disease investigations out of fear of bad publicity or adverse economic
impacts
such as trade embargoes or loss of tourism. - Commentary,
Biodefense
Brief, March 27, 2003, Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies Clinicians' Biodefense Network
World Health Organization
Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
<http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en/>
Canadian SARS
Update
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/protection/warnings/sars/sars_numbers.html>
U.S. Centers
for Disease Control
<http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/sars.htm>
.
[Additional
reports and updates can be accessed through ProMED-mail
<http://www.promedmail.org>.
ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious
Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>]
Related
Information:
- Preparedness for
Deliberate Epidemics: In May 2002, the World Health Assembly
passed a resolution, Global public health response to natural
occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological and
chemical agents or radionuclear material that affect health. See
resolution. The Secretariat provided a background paper, Deliberate use
of biological and chemical agents to cause harm for consideration by
the World Health Assembly.
- Pandemics: How
They Start, How They Spread, and Their Potential Impact: Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention
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